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UTILIZING SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS TO REMEDY
SCHOOL FINANCING PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 1996, Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Lisa
Sadler upheld the constitutionality of the Pilot Project Scholarship Plan ("Pilot
Project"), which allows Cleveland elementary age students to use public funds to
pay for private schools through an educational voucher. In the wake of what
undoubtedly will be the first decision of many on the Cleveland voucher program,
former Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole announced that voucher pro-
grams and school choice alternatives have become the "civil rights movement of
the 1990s."2 In this era when business and political leaders want to hold students
to higher standards, impediments including the "intransigence of the [teacher]
unions has slowed the pace of school reforms, eroding public confidence in the
[public] schools ..... Proponents of educational vouchers believe that vouchers
would give parents greater control over their children's education, and this con-
trol would force the public school system to compete with non-public schools for
1. Mary B. W. Tabor, Education: State's Voucher Plan Upheld, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug.
1, 1996, at 2B (This "closely watched decision" is "expected to be appealed as high as the
[U.S.] Supreme Court.") The decision is considered a victory for school choice supporters and
sets in motion the Ohio legislature's plan for 1,500 kindergarten through third grade students
to be provided vouchers for up to $2,250 for expenditure in private schools, including religious
private schools. Id. The first appellate stage was reached on May 1, 1997 when an Ohio
Appeals Court overturned the decision. See Simons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96 APEO8-982, 1997
WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id. (President Clinton is opposed to the educational voucher program).
3. Thomas Toch et al., Why Teachers Don't Teach, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 26,
1996, at 63, 64 ("Union policies that work against quality teaching are driving many of the top
teachers out of public schools, making it tougher for good teachers who stay to do their best
work and leaving incompetents entrenched in many classrooms ... spurring an unprecedent-
ed wave of tuition voucher plans and similarly targeted initiatives.").
4. See Stephen Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 937, 940 (1993) ("Currently public education is a public monopoly, with all the defects
of a monopoly. Breaking the monopoly and forcing schools to compete in the market place
will not only better match student needs and desires with educational resources, but will pro-
duce better education for all at a lower cost."); Jack Alan Kramer, Note, Vouching for Federal
Educational Choice: If You Pay Them, They will Come, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1005, 1008-1009
(1995). See generally JEANNE ALLEN & ANGELA HULSEY, SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS:
WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE STATES 1 (1992) ("Public opinion polls indicate that most
Americans see giving parents a choice of schools as a key reform-perhaps the central reform.
Transforming parents into educational consumers will force the school to shape up or lose cus-
tomers.").
5. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 1009; see also ALLEN & HULSEY, supra note 4, at l("It
forces teachers and school administrators to improve instruction and toughen standards if they
are to retain students--and with them funding.").
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students.' The competition for students would foster greater efficiency and quali-
ty in the public school services.-
Opponents of school voucher programs contend that thy problem with
public schools is not efficiency, but rather lack of state or federal financial sup-
port.6 Simply put, the diversion of funds from the public schools into voucher pro-
grams is not as effective as pouring those same funds into the public school cof-
fers.7
This comment will focus on the existing problems in school financing,8
and the judicial treatment of these problems.9 Additionally, this comment will
address whether school voucher programs are a viable option in addressing school
financing inequities,"' with a particular focus on the existing voucher programs in
Cleveland and Milwaukee." Finally, this comment will evaluate whether a vouch-
er program would survive equal protection scrutiny. 2
6. See Amy J. Schmitz, Note, Providing an Escape for Inner City Children: Creating a
Federal Remedy for Education Ills of Poor Urban Schools, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1639-
1647 (1994) ("outlining the particularly egregious situation in poor urban areas, and
explain[ing] why such areas lack sufficient funding and therefore offer the lowest quality edu-
cation."); see also American Federation of Teachers Files Lawsuit Against the State of Ohio
Over Cleveland School Voucher Program, U.S. Newswire, Jan. 10, 1996, available in Westlaw,
1996 WL 5618909 (According to Rich DeColibus, president of Cleveland Teachers Union:
"[t]he State should be helping the [Cleveland] district return to solvency by assisting us finan-
cially and helping us upgrade our educational offerings. Instead in a time of financial crisis,
the state has cynically ordered us to divert scarce funds to an experiment that is unconstitu-
tional, unregulated, unproved and discriminatory.").
7. See Richard M. Oldrieve, Fooling Ourselves About Vouchers, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1996
at A19 (comparing the voucher system to a new company who will go bankrupt, leaving the
children to go back to under supported public schools).
8. See infra part II.
9. See infra part III.
10. See infra part VI.
11. See infra part V.
12. See infra part VII.
13. JAMES W. GUTHRIE ET AL., SCHOOL FINANCE AND EDUCATION POLICY: ENHANCING
EDUCATIONAL EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY, AND CHOICE 128 (2d ed. 1988) ("The American sys-
tem of public education is the largest single enterprise of state and local government. Even
nationally it is only rivaled by defense and welfare expenditures").
14. JONATHAN F. BUCHTER ET AL., OHIO SCHOOL LAW, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LAW AND
FISCAL PROCEDURE 9 (1st ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) ("In 1993-94, a total of $8.7 billion dol-
lars was spent on elementary and secondary education in Ohio public schools, with an addi-
tional $272 million spent on education in the joint vocational high schools.").
15. James C. Joslin, Note, Developing a School Funding Remedy Framework for Ohio and
Beyond, 56 Ohio St. L. J. 1247, 1247 (1995)(He contends the problem of lack of school fund-
ing on the national level is "alarming in magnitude. A recent report issued by the [Federal]
General Accounting Office estimates that one-third of the nation's eighty thousand public
schools are in such poor repair that students attending them are being educated in unsafe or
unsuitable conditions.").
16. Morris L. Hawk, Comment, "As Perfect as Can be Devised": DeRolph v. State of Ohio
[Vol. 30:3
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II. SCHOOL FINANCING PROBLEMS
In nearly every state, the funding of the public school systems is a huge
undertaking.' 3 In Ohio, in 1993-94, for example, the Department of Education,
placed the per pupil expenditures at $4,650 from general funds and $5,035 per
pupil from all funds. 4 Despite these enormous outlays, many schools are in dis-
repair. One writer described these problems found throughout Ohio by stating:
At the Dawson-Bryant School District in rural Lawrence County, the
building for grades four through eight is heated by a coal furnace,
which leaves a fine layer of dust covering everything inside. The band
practices in a former coal bin. On hot days during the first week of
school, the Monitor elementary school averages 94 degrees. If more
than three teachers plug in fans at the same time, the circuit breakers
engage because the wiring is so bad. The entire science department has
purchased one item, an aquarium, in the last three years. Most telling,
Dawson Bryant School District, as of 1993, had yet to meet Ohio's
1983 minimum education standards.'6
and the Right to Education in Ohio, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 687 (1995) (discussing the
plaintiff's offer of proof in an Ohio school district inadequacy case); see also Joslin, supra note
15, at 1247 (citing other school facility inadequacies including no restrooms within a school
building, the only library in one county is an abandoned library truck, and a school band prac-
ticing in a kitchen.); seealso William Phyllis, Children in America's Schools 8 Ohio School L.
J. 57 (1996). (discussing inadequacies and inequities of school funding as presculed in
Children in America's Schools with Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast Sept. 13, 1996)).
17. BUCHTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 10. In the 1993-94 school year, the percentage of
Ohio school revenues were broken down as follows: 50% of the total were from local rev-
enues, 43% were from state aid, and 6% were from federal aid; Id. In addition:
Boards of Education derive their money from several sources: 1) the statefounda-
tion program and other state programs; 2) the sale or other disposi-tion of school
property 3) local property taxes (that is, general and special levies) and the undi-
vided classified property tax; 4) a school district income tax, if approved by dis-
trict voters; 5) a shared municipal income tax, if approved by municipality's vot-
ers, and 6) miscellaneous sources, such as gifts, federal funds, and tuition.
Id. at 463.
18. Id. ("The two major sources of the revenue for most boards of education are taxes levied
on property within a school district and the state foundation program.").
19. See CHARLES S. BENSON ET AL., PLANNING FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM-FINANCIAL
AND SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES 4 (1974). But see Hawk, supra note 16, at 688 "The acknowl-
edged culprit behind these deficiencies is the state's current funding system, the school foun-
dation program: [A] myriad of factors... create insufficient funds in some districts and extrav-
agant riches in others."); For a discussion of the local property tax system of raising funds for
education and its effects on nonresidential entities, see Kirk J. Stark, Note, Rethinking State-
Spring 1997]
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To what can these problems be attributed? One must first examine the
school financing scheme. The federal, state and local government all play a role
in raising revenues for education." In Ohio, the largest revenue generators are
local property taxes and state aid. 8 Local property tax measures are particularly
problematic for school districts, especially in areas where property values are
lower, because the districts are unable to raise the necessary revenues to support
their schools absent raising their tax rate to an exorbitantly high percentage.'
Revenue raising has become an important issue because most believe that
the amount of dollars placed into a school district and the resulting quality of edu-
cation is intertwined.2" However, some scholars contend that a direct relationship
between financing and student achievement has never been clearly established.2'
Nevertheless, courts have assumed that "money and quality were closely relat-
ed."22  Assuming arguendo, that financing has a direct impact upon academic
achievement, there are several measures a school board can take to try to create
equity in financing."
wide Taxation of Nonresidential Property for Public Schools, 102 Yale L. J. 805 (1993).
20. See generally Hawk, supra note 16, at 690. One court "linked the disparities in funding
to the lack of educational opportunity by citing evidence that 'school districts with expendi-
tures in the top thirty percent have, by subject matter, higher levels of students succeeding or
passing the proficiency tests and scoring satisfactorily on achievement scores."' (citation
omitted). Hawk, supra note 16, at 690.
21. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8. ("Do dollars make a difference in education?
On the basis of existing research this question cannot be answered unequivocally." The authors
believe that the measure of student achievement (student standardized testing) does not test all
the areas of what a student needs to know as a result of education. "Such tests tell little about
a student's enjoyment of learning, whether he has gained a deeper awareness of himself.., or
whether he will become a thoughtful, capable adult.")
22. William R. Andersen, State School Finance Litigation, 14 URB. LAW. 583, 587 (1982)
One "New York court was persuaded that money and quality were closely related, enumerat-
ing the things money can buy, including transportation, supplies, library materials, textbooks,
and 'one of the most important indicators of quality,' the student/teacher ratio." Id.
Conversely, Andersen contends that the correlation between spending and quality may be less
direct and points out that it "is a troubled question, plagued by controversial standards and soft
data." Id. at 586.
23. One of the measures typically utilized to raise funds is the property tax levy which needs
to be approved by the local constituents. The Ohio school financing litigation typifies the
property tax struggle. One Ohio common pleas court found that the property tax levy system
denies the plaintiffs equal protection and benefit of the law because of the disparities in fund-
ing from one school district to another. See DeRolph v. State, No. 2043, slip op. at 463, 474
(Ohio, Perry C.P. 1994.) On appeal, the Court reversed this opinion upholding the property tax
system and finding that "no expert testimony was offered to establish that [the plaintiff school
district] lacked the means to come into compliance for those areas in which school adminis-
trators believe that lack of compliance already exists." DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995
WL 557316, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). The Ohio Supreme Court recently ruled in the
DeRolph case that funding schools primarily through property taxes is unconstitutional under
the Ohio Constitution. DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997); see also Joslin, supra
note 15, at 1253.
24. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Educational Equalization and Suburban Sprawl: Subsidizing
[Vol. 30:3
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A. Approaches to Create Equity in Education
Equalization Aid is one means through which a state could balance out
the distribution of financial resources from school district to district." One exam-
ple of equalization aid is called District Power Equalizing (D.P.E.), wherein the
state board of education guarantees every school district in the state a minimum
fixed figure, or "Assessed Valuation Per Pupil.'2 The local school district or pol-
icy maker must then determine how to raise their per pupil expenditure by taxing
or foregoing spending in other municipal areas, and if they fail to meet their min-
imum level per pupil, they can apply to the state for additional financial assis-
tance. 26 At least one state supreme court has commended its state legislature for
enacting the D.P.E. program." However, D.P.E. and other equalization formulas
have been criticized because they emphasize local choice in these education mat-
ters, leaving the state in a position where they can do nothing to induce more or
Iless spending by the individual school district.
2
1
the Suburbs through School Finance Reform, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 161, 166-167 (1976) (The
author deems these "alternative aid formulas," which he divides into three types: 1) Flat per
pupil grants; 2) Percentage-based cost sharing grants; and 3) Aid devised based on the per pupil
taxable wealth.).
25. JAMES W. GUTHRIE, EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCING, DISTRICT POWER EQUALIZING
7 (1975) (wherein each school "has the same dollar resource per pupil as any other school dis-
trict.").
26. See id. at 7-13.
27. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981)("The fact that District Power
Equalization has been enacted provides an indication that the legislature is aware of the prob-
lem.").
28. See Guthrie, supra note 25, at 10-13 This approach leaves the state in a situation where
they may be forced to reward local school districts, who have the financial capacity to meet
the minimum student expenditure, but choose instead to forego spending the funds raised
through property taxes and merely apply to the state for funding. Proponents contend that the
state can combat these instances through different financial incentives, such as by lowering the
financial support where a school district has a low property tax rate or low educational spend-
ing.
29. DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995 WL 557316, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), rev'd 678
N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997).
30. See id.; see also Susan L. Klar, Legislative Service Commission Research Memorandum:
Financing Ohio Schools, at I (Jan. 18, 1995) available in Hannah On-line, Education ("The
stipulated amount, formally called the "formula amount," [is] established annually by the
General Assembly. The formula amount represents a minimum of combined state and local
funding that is roughly guaranteed for each pupil. For... 1995 the formula amount is $3,035
per pupil .... ").
31. See Klar, supra note 30, at 5 (The factor reflects "differences in doing business" from
one county to another and for example is "1.0 for Meigs County and 1.075 for Hamilton
County.").
32. Id. at 4 (The state would supply the aid needed in one of several forms including "basic
aid, categorical aid, grants, excess lottery stipends, building assistance and property tax roll
back reimbursement.").
33. See DeRolph, No. CA-477, 1995 WL 557316, at *2 (However, "[tlor 1992, the State
Board of Education postulated that the foundation figure should be $4,000 per pupil.").
Spring 1997]
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In 1982, Ohio began using the Foundation Formula," which is similar to
D.P.E.. The Foundation Formula sets a per pupil expenditure per year (in 1992,
this expenditure was $2,817 per pupil), which the state and "the over 600 city,
local and exempted village school boards" cannot go below."' This figure is then
multiplied by an area price balancing formula the "school district equalization
factor" which differs from county to county.3' The total then is what the state guar-
antees as a minimal expenditure, 32 although a school district could choose to go
above that level of funding.3 What should be noted about the Ohio program and
any program based on property tax levels combined with state assistance is that
they are subject to court scrutiny.-'
Another approach to creating equity in public school financing could be
a tuition. However, tuition plans have been deemed unconstitutional for school
age children in most states.3 Under a tuition arrangement, each child could be
charged, even if only for textbooks, courses, materials or activities. 6 Although all
students would be treated equally, this type of financing would be ineffective for
those without the resources to pay. A similar approach could be for a state to
charge for non-educational services such as after school sports programs. 3
34. See Andersen, supra note 22, at 585 ("Perhaps the narrowest line of attack and one per-
mitting the most conventional judicial role is... [where] there are unjustified disparities in the
funding abilities of the state's school districts, producing inevitable expenditure and educa-
tional differences which cannot be justified under the equal protection clause."). But, where
some minimum level of funding is required it is "more difficult of all for the courts" because
in these instances unfairness may not exist, Id. at 595; see also infra notes 176-189 and accom-
panying text (concerning equal protection).
35. See GUTHRIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 127 (State Constitutions usually specify that all
children receive a free education.); see also Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist.
18, 548 S.W. 2d 554 (Mo. 1977 ) (charging of registration fee unconstitutional). But see Holler
v. Rock Hill School Dist. 38 S.E. 220 (S.C. 1901) (special circumstances warranted the charg-
ing of tuition which was upheld by the state courts); Kiddie Korner Day Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 285 S.E. 2d 110 (N.C. App. 1981)prob. juris noted, 291 S.E. 2d
150 (N.C. 1982) (tuition charged by elementary school for after school day care did not vio-
late state constitution).
36. See GUTHRIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 127; see also Jeffrey F Ghent, Annotation,
Validity of Exaction of Fees from Children Attending Elementary or Secondary Public Schools,
41 A.L.R. 3d 752 (1972); Carpio v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, 524 P. 2d 948 (Ariz.
1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 982 (1975)(fees may be charged for textbooks).
37. See Atty. Gen. v. E. Jackson Pub. Sch., 372 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich. 1985).
38. In Ohio, issue I on the state election ballot for November 5, 1996 was a riverboat gam-
bling plan, whereby some proceeds from the gambling were to go to fund state schools. It
failed. See Dale Dempsey & Susan Vinella, Voters Reject Casinos, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 6, 1996, at 3A.
39. Several states have a long history with various lottery proceeds going to education. In
school funding litigation, some school systems have contended that these additional proceeds
act as "equalization grants to towns" which makes the remaining system constitutional. One
court found that this type of "flat grant has little, if any effect on the equalizing the ability of
the various towns to finance education .... " Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 369 (Conn.
1977); See generally Paul D. Delva, Comment, The Promises and Perils of Legalized Gamb-
[Vol. 30:3
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Others suggest a state could raise additional revenues for public educa-
tion through some collateral measure, such as riverboat gambling.3 Lottery pro-
ceeds are also sometimes aimed towards public education. 9 These programs
increase the amount of money in the state treasury but do not directly equalize
funding from district to district.4 '
An approach contemplated by at least one scholar is full state funding of
education.4' This approach would require the state to provide all or nearly all the
funds to support school districts. 2 The state would probably need to increase the
tax burden on its citizens, but this method of funding would create uniformity and
greater equity and opportunity.43 The drawbacks of full state funding include that
it centralizes education, taking it away from local actors who might have a better
approach to educating their children."4
ling for Local Governments: Who Decides How to Stack the Deck?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 847
(1995).
40. See JAMES A. RAPP, EDUC. LAW, (5.01 (3)(e), at 5-64 (1987 & Supp. 1996)("Although
lottery funds are often designated for education, this usually does not result in a dollar for dol-
lar increase in educational funding.").
41. Richard A. Rossmiller, Full State Funding: An Analysis and Critique, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF SCHOOL FINANCE 43,43 (Kern Alexander & K. Forbis Jordan
eds., 1973) (contending that school financing has become one of the "critical issues of our
time," and that due to the rising cost of educating children the "overworked local property tax
base" is ineffectual.).
42. Id. at 43-44.
43. See id. at 67-69 (A more "efficient district organization," "reduction of interdistrict com-
petition" and "greater tax equity" are additional benefits of a full state funding program.).
44. See id. at 69-71 (The author lists "regression toward mediocrity," "dilution of local con-
trol," "lack of flexibility, innovation or experimentation," and more "competition for revenue"
as drawbacks of full state funding.).
45. See Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (Ohio 1979), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) ("Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution in 1802, the General
Assembly in 1821 enacted a bill enabling local schools and school districts to be organized;
and in 1825, the tradition of utilizing real property taxation to support public schools began..
.") (citations omitted).
46. Id. ("Ohio has continued this financial partnership with local school districts until the
present day.").
47. W. MONFORT BARR ET AL., FINANCING PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOL FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (1970) ("Functional operation and deci-
sionmaking may be decentralized to local school districts, but this should not result in reduced
accountability .... Legal responsibility for all aspects of education resides with each state,
therefore, the state through its legislature and various state agencies should have a high level
of interest in concerns associated with adequate educational programs, adequate school facili-
ties ... and fiscal accountability.").
48. See Ted Sanders, Proposals for the Elimination of Wealth Based Disparities in Education,
Report to the Ohio Legislature, at 4 (June 19, 1995) available in Hannah On-line (Sanders, the
Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction writes, "In summary, four principles should guide
the reform of Ohio's school funding system: adequacy, equity, flexibility and accountability.
[I]n the context of this report adequacy means more than barely enough."); See e.g.,
DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997).
49. OHIO CONST. art. VI, ( 2; see also Hawk, supra note 16, at 699, 700 (There is a constitu-
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B. State and Local Government Involvement in Education Equity
The interplay between state and local actors in the education arena is of
major significance. Past history favors the involvement of local interests in school
funding," particularly in Ohio, where "It]he history of education funding ... has
been an accommodation between two competing interests, the interest in local
control of educational programs and the means to fund them and the interest of
the state in insuring that all children receive an adequate education."4 In addition,
the state's interest is also quite compelling.47 In Ohio, the state is required to pro-
duce a thorough education for all its students, and the state is obligated to pro-
vide the funds necessary to meet that requirement within the confines of the Ohio
Constitution." Specifically, the Ohio Constitution, Article VI, Section 2 requires
that the General Assembly "shall make such provisions ... as ... [to] secure a
thorough and efficient system of schools throughout the state."4 Accordingly, any
state equalization aid or any voucher program must produce a thorough education
for all students. Undoubtedly, some approach must be put in place to achieve
financial equity of school funding, but it is difficult to find a consensus as to how
this should be accomplished.-"
tional "duty [upon the state] to fund schools, but also a duty to provide sufficient funds to
secure a high quality of public education throughout the state.").
50. See e.g. Nancy M. Gaeta, Solutions to School Finance Inequities Posed by the Levittown
Decision, 14 Urb. Law. 603, 604-616 (1982). Even a Special Task Force on Equity and
Excellence in Education in New York, although they could agree, after three years of exami-
nation, on many issues, did not agree on all the remedies. Id. at 604. The task force was creat-
ed by the New York governor and board of regents in 1978 and "consisted of business, indus-
try, labor and farming, local government officials, parents, teacher and taxpayers." Id. at 603
Their final conclusion was that "the state should ensure that all students be guaranteed at least
an adequate basic level of support." Id. at 606-608.
51. See David Dormont, Separate and Unequal: School District Financing, 11 LAW & INEQ.
J. 261, 264 (1992)("Recognizing the great inequalities caused by budget cuts and unequal
funding of education, many parents and school districts are now in court challenging the con-
stitutionality of their state's funding schemes.").
52. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant part that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. See Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI, Maximizing Equal Access for K-12
Students in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1533,
1541 (1995)(Beginning as early as the 1960's and 1970's, "aggressive plaintiff's" began to
achieve success in their equal protection challenges concerning school financing); see also R.
Stephen Browning, The School Finance Reform Movement in the Courts: A Brief History, in
THE COURTS SEEK FISCAL NEUTRALITY IN EDUCATION 21, 21(D. Gene Watson ed., 1972).
[Vol. 30:3
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III. SCHOOL FUNDING AND EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS
The school funding problems have led to legal challenges of existing
funding systems." One of the primary theories under which the inadequacies of
school funding has been challenged successfully is under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 and analogous state equal protection
clauses.13 The Equal Protection Clause, although created to secure equal treatment
of former slaves, has been interpreted as prohibiting the use of discriminatory
classifications to assure the equal treatment of all people. 4 School financing chal-
lengers contend that individuals who are poor are a suspect class under the exist-
ing funding system and that because education is a fundamental right, the exist-
ing system violates the Equal Protection Clause."
A. Federal Judicial Remedy?
The availability of a federal judicial remedy for the school funding inad-
equacies was addressed in the United States Supreme Court decision in San
Antonio Independent School District vs. Rodriguez." In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs
challenged the utilization of local property taxes as a primary method of school
funding, asserting that the resulting educational system violates the Equal
Protection Clause." The Court, under equal protection analysis, first classified the
right involved and the class of individuals affected by the funding program." The
Court's "classifications" are crucial, usually determining the case's outcome."
The Rodriguez Court found that lack of wealth is not a suspect class for purpos-
es of the Federal Equal Protection Clause and that education is not a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution.' In upholding the property tax
approach to financing, the Court noted that "at least where wealth is involved, the
Equal Protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages." 6' What the court did leave open, however, was whether education is
a fundamental right under an individual state's constitution. 6 Accordingly, a great
deal of litigation has evolved in state courts pertaining to equal protection and
school funding."
54. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 1040 (The Equal Protection Clause was enacted after the
Civil War, and has been extended to "impose a general restraint on the intentional use of dis-
criminatory classifications.").
55. See Biegel, supra note 53, at 1542.
56. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
57. See Dormont, supra note 51, at 274-75 (The plaintiffs included Demetrio Rodriguez, who
had four children in the Edgewood Elementary School, which was in poor shape and lacked
the necessary school supplies and lacked quality teachers. "Ninety percent of the school dis-
trict population Was Mexican-American, the majority of the remainder was African-
American." The Edgewood School District had the highest property tax assessment rate in the
area however, but could only raise "$26 per pupil.").
58. See e.g. Andersen, supra note 22, at 589 (Under an Equal Protection Clause analysis,
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B. State Judicial Remedy?
Despite the large increase in the amount of school funding litigation in
state courts, little uniformity exists throughout the country concerning what type
of funding scheme meets state equal protection requirements.' 4 A great deal of
criticism comes from commentators who contend that most state courts have
failed to protect "impoverished urban students" in school finance disparity cases."
the United States Supreme Court first examines whether the "classification under review
involves a 'suspect class' or a 'fundamental interest.' If so, the court scrutinizes the classifi-
cation strictly, striking it down unless the state can show a compelling interest in the classifi-
cation as drawn which cannot be protected by less harmful means. Other classifications are
treated more generously and upheld unless the complainant can negate any rational basis for
the classification.").
59. For further discussion of the application of the equal protection clause see the following
U.S. Supreme Court cases: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination in admin-
istration of statute violates equal protection clause); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977), (discrimination in municipal zoning); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (equal protection invoked in desegregation of schools); Keyes
v. Sch. Dist. #1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)(invalidat-
ing through the equal protection clause an attempt by the federal district court to require the
Kansas City School District to create magnet schools, which offer special programs, to draw
white students back to the inner cities).
60. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25 (The "absence of any evidence that the financing system dis-
criminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute
deprivation of education- the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in tradi-
tional terms.").
61. Id. at 24. The Court found two compelling arguments in favor of the property tax based
systems: 1. The poorest families do not always reside in the poorest school districts. The
Court contends that in one state the poorer families lived near large commercial areas which
bring in a large amount of property tax revenues and; 2. Children are still being provided an
adequate education, even if it is of a poorer quality then that education being provided to rich-
er school districts. Id. at 23-24.
62. The Rodriguez Court determined that education was not guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. However, nearly all state constitutions have a guarantee of education. See
Andersen, supra note 22, at 589; see also Bill Swinford, Shedding the Doctrinal Security
Blanket: How State Supreme Courts Interpret their State Constitutions in the Shadow of
Rodriguez, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 981, 981 (1994).
63. See Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and Legal
Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (1995). Since the Rodriguez
decision, litigants have filed "more than sixty pieces of litigation in forty-one different states."
Id.; see also Schmitz, supra note 6, at 1652 ("Dissatisfaction with funding inequities has
become more prevalent after the decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez; schools in twenty-eight states have challenged their states' funding systems since
1972.").
64. See Heise, supra note 63, at 1735 ("Unfortunately, the litigation has resolved few ques-
tions. If anything, the number of questions concerning school finance and their complexity
have increased .... ").; See generally, Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Validity of Basing
Public School Financing System on Local Property Taxes, 41 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1972).
65. Among the problems with these state court decisions are that they have provided no rem-
edy in some cases and in others have "ordered noncomprehensive remedies" which are inade-
quate. Schmitz, supra note 6, at 1653; see also Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV 101, 102-103 (1996) (Most "lawsuits
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Some maintain, however, that the impact of various court decisions is difficult to
measure because of the invalid assumption that court decisions directly affect
educational spending.' Nevertheless, state supreme courts continue to promulgate
decisions concerning school funding plans."
brought to challenge inequalities of educational resources have upheld the existing structures,
notwithstanding the proof in many cases of wide disparities between rich and poordistricts...
The quality of the educational opportunities offered in ... most American urban centers...
remains shockingly poor.").
66. See Heise, supra note 63, at 1760 After two state supreme court decisions invalidating
the school funding schemes, there was an overall decline in the educational funding in the state
thereafter. Id. at 1761. Parameters such as past state budgets, play a larger role in influencing
educational spending than court decisions in these states.
67. See Joslin, supra note 15, at 1254 State judiciaries tend to be reluctant to get involved in
school finance litigation for several reasons, but are forced to nonetheless. Id. One of the rea-
sons is that courts believe they lack "judicial competen ce" to act in the area as complex and
involved as school funding because of the difficulty in assessing how to find a means to pro-
vide the best education for all children. Id. Another reason is that they do not wish to involve
themselves in taxation issues. Id. Both of these arguments emphasize why courts tend to defer
to the legislature who are more experienced in handling these types of situations.
68. See Swinford, supra note 62, at 992 ("[M]any of the courts ... equated their state con-
stitutions' equal protection clauses with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
69. See Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); see also Lafayette Steel Co. v.
Dearborn, 360 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (finding no violation of equal protection clause
by applying the rational basis test and not strict scrutiny).
70. One author criticizes Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), where the New Jersey
Supreme Court followed the "two tiered test" from Rodriguez, and found that education was
not a fundamental right under the New Jersey Constitution's equal protection clause. Id. The
author contends that the New Jersey court's decision had a "greater impact on school finance
litigation . . .than Rodriguez." Id. It found no state equal protection violation but still
declared the system of finance unconstitutional. Id. The author contends that the Court dis-
carded a key argument. Id. A primary distinguishing characteristic between the U.S.
Constitution and the N.J. Constitution, namely that the N.J. constitution, like many states,
specifically mentions and refers to education while the U.S. Constitution does not. Id. The
author calls this the "implicit/explicit standard." Id. The author contends that this standard
should have influenced the eventual result in Robinson, but it did not. Id. In fact, many state
courts failed to take into account this distinguishing variable, the 'implicit/explicit standard' in
evaluating their equal protection clauses in school funding litigation finding the "test as
unmanageable." Swinford, supra note 62, at 991.
71. See e.g. Lafayette Steel Co., 360 F. Supp. at 1130-1131 ("The most practical method of
implementing local control and the most effective way to draw on resources of local commu-
nities is to respect existing governmental borders .... In such a complex arena [taxation] in
which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard
of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection
Clause.").
72. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. Denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); see
also Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1977).
73. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977). Here, the court pointed to
Connecticut's long history of providing for the education of their young with such require-
ments as compulsory attendance. "[T]he state recognizing that providing for education is a
state duty and function now codified in the constitution" and found education a fundamental
right.
74. See id. at 374-376; see also Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. #66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806,
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The array of state court decisions regarding state equal protection claus-
es and school funding plans have several common themes, but varying results.
Some courts view their state's equal protection clause to be fundamentally the
same as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution., Courts
that adhere to this view tend to find that education is not a fundamental right
under the state constitution, and consequently find no equal protection viola-
tion.'
Conversely, some states have struck down the property tax based school
funding plans as a violation of their state equal protection clause." Connecticut's
Supreme Court, for example, decided that "the right to education is so basic and
fundamental that any infringement on that right must be strictly scrutinized."7"
These courts have also expressed concerns that the property based tax systems
create a disparity in the quality of education that the students receive across
school districts.74 One court called for "significant equalizing state support ... to
implement the requirement that the state provide a substantially equal education
opportunity to its youth ... .
815 (Ariz. 1994) (striking down a school funding scheme not entirely based on local property
taxes, but primarily based on local property taxes).
75. Horton, 376 A.2d at 375.
76. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing District Power Equalizing).
77. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State., 746 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Okla. 1987)
(upholding school financing system under equal protection which was primarily local proper-
ty tax based but had a "[ftoundation [p]rogram [which] consists of a certain amount of money
per pupil which the Legislature has determined is necessary to operate a minimum program
within a school district.").
78. See DeRolph v. State, No. 2043, slip op. 463, 474 (Ohio C.P., Perry Co. 1994), rev'd CA-
447, 1995 WL 557316 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), rev'd 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997); see also
supra note 23 (for a discussion of the DeRolph rationale).
79. See DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995 W.L. 557316 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
80. Although establishing a basic basement level of spending needed appears to be a simple
process, a "myriad of factors converge in its calculation to create insufficient funds in some
districts and extravagant riches in others." Hawk, supra note 16, at 688; see supra notes 29-
34 and accompanying text (discussing the Ohio foundation program and its implementation).
81. See Hawk, supra note 16, at 690 (The court's rationale for finding education as a funda-
mental right is by pulling "the right to education from Article I, sections 1, 2, and 7 of the Ohio
Constitution.").
82. See DeRolph, No. CA-477, 1995 WL 557316, at *3, *4 The appellate court pointed to the
prior school finance decision of Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368
(1979), cert. Denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980), wherein, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically
announced that education is not a fundamental right under Ohio Law.
83. Id. at *3, *4; (The Court opined that "[t]his issue [school financing and the foundation
formula] should not be legislated by the judiciary but should be brought before the General
Assembly for public debate and change[d] if necessary or desired"); see also supra note 70
(discussing the 'implicit-explicit' test of Rodriguez).
84. DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997).
85. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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However, some legal critics maintain that the similarity of state and fed-
eral equal protection clauses is not as important as other state constitutional lan-
guage, particularly references to education.7 ' Despite this criticism, some state
courts have upheld funding plans under state equal protection requirements, while
arguing that local control of school funding schemes should be respected.7'
However, state equalization formulas, including D.P.E., 76 have also come
under court scrutiny." One example is the school funding litigation in Ohio, which
started when the trial court in DeRolph v. State declared that "Ohio's statutory
scheme for financing public elementary and secondary education violates the
Ohio Constitution.""' The decision, which was reversed on appeal, attacked the
school foundation program."9 The school foundation program in Ohio sets and
guarantees a basic aid level for all schools throughout the state.8 ' In its equal pro-
tection analysis, the DeRolph common pleas cotirt found education to be a fund-
86. See Enrich, supra note 65, at 106-110 ( "One class of arguments.., contending that the
state [equal protection] clause, unlike its federal parallel should be construed to bar distinc-
tions, grounded in differences in property wealth, in the fiscal capacity of different school sys-
tems in the state .... [Slecond class of arguments... rely on the ... state's education clause
as the justification for reaching a different result under the state equal protection clause than
under its federal counterpart .... [T]hird class of arguments ... assert that the state's duty to
provide for a system of public schools ... [A]rguments in the first two classes, the focus is on
equality .... [T]he third class of arguments ... opens the way to a crucial shift in focus, away
from educational quality and toward educational adequacy.").
87. One commentator contends that the central theory to the equAlity argument is that is
espouses competitiveness and at the advent of initial school finance reform "the early allure of
equality arguments was due, in no small part, to the hope of building on the dramatic expan-
sion of the federal equal protection clause as a tool of social transformation." Enrich, supra
note 65, at 143. However, the author believes the equality argument is too simplistic, too nor-
mative-in that it threatens wealthier districts and that the language of state constitutions create
textual conflicts making equality inapplicable. See id. at 144-161. Adequacy arguments, how-
ever, "find an explicit and straightforward textual source" in most states, appeal to one's sense
of "fairness and opportunity" and are less normative- by being far less threatening to wealth-
ier district. Id at 166-169.
88. James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If 35 B.C. L. Rev. 619, 625 (1994)
("[T]oday's public education system fails its own equity test through its reliance on property
taxes ....").
89. PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION 14 (1994).
90. Id. One of these school choice alternatives is called controlled choice which includes
interdistrict, intrasectional, intersectional, or magnet school choice. In controlled choice, the
student or parent is restricted in choosing the other public schools either within or outside their
district. Alternatively, open enrollment choice, such as school vouchers, allows parents to
choose with virtually no restrictions by area or whether the school is public or private.
91. Id. Vouchers are "a specific system of certificate or cash payments by the government
that enables public school students to attend schools of their choice, public or private...
[v]ouchers have a fixed value and are redeemed at the time of enrollment. Id. One author
describes the basic definition of vouchers as follows:
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amental right under Ohio law and applied strict scrutiny to the foundation pro-
gram." The DeRolph appellate court disagreed, finding education not to be a fun-
damental right under Ohio law, and applying the rational basis test.12 The DeRolph
appellate court was particularly critical of the trial courts determination that the
key to evaluating fundamental rights is whether the constitution specifically men-
tions education and the court also gave deference to the legislature in resolving
school finance issues." In April 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion, agreeing with the common pleas court that Ohio's current school funding
plan is unconstitutional."
C. Equality or Adequacy Decisions under Equal Protection
The Rodriguez decision also sparked debate about whether equality or
adequacy is the key in equal protection analysis. In Justice Marshall's dissent in
Rodriguez, he wrote that "It]his Court has never suggested that because some ade-
quate level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of ser-
vices is therefore constitutionally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not
addressed to minimal sufficiency but rather to unjustifiable inequalities of state
action.""5 This leaves open whether a party should challenge on the basis of
whether all districts are provided equal funding, or whether all districts are pro-
vided adequate funding.16 Although the initial school finance challenges came
under a demand for equality, there has been a shift to adequacy arguments, which
have been more successful.87 This may be due to what one legal critic calls the
"equity myth" in education, about which he writes:
[U]nder a voucher plan, the state issues a document called a voucher to
each parent for each child eligible to attend public schools. The parent
then delivers that voucher to the school of his or her own choice. The
number of vouchers received by a school determines the amount of tax
funds available to the school to finance the education at that school.
Robert J. Bruno, Constitutional Analysis of Educational Vouchers in Minnesota, 53 ED. LAW.
REP. 9, 10 (1989).
92. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EDUCATION, IN ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (R.A. Solo ed., 1955); Michael J. Stick, Educational
Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 423, 427 (1995) (allow-
ing parents to choose between public and private schools would foster competition).
93. Stick, supra note 92, at 424 ("Because public schools exist as local monopolies ... they
have little incentive to make decisions on the basis of productivity.").
94. Id. at 427-28 ("Vouchers ... became linked to segregation... " and concern arose that
southern white families might be provided vouchers to circumvent the existing desegregation
process.).
95. See COOKSON, supra note 89, at 7 (Reagan waged an "ideological war against govern-
ment spending, wasteful public institutions and the welfare state in general.").
96. See ALLEN & HULSEY, supra note 4, at I (contending that every statistical measure
shows student scores declining). "Last year, for the fourth consecutive year, the Scholastic
Aptitude Test scores dropped. The 'Report Card' issued... by the National Educational Goals
Panel reveals that only 14 percent of American eighth graders can solve math problems involv-
[Vol. 30:3
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 30 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol30/iss3/3
UTILIZING SCHOOL VOUCHER PLANS
Closely linked to the education establishment's assump-
tions regarding the socializing power of the common school is
the belief that government monopoly is the only way to ensure
equity in a society rent by social, ethnic and economic divi-
sions. The track record of public education as an integrator of
all American children on the long schoolbench does not supp-
ort this belief.88
IV. DEFINING EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS
Educational vouchers have been generally categorized as a type of
"school choice," wherein a student or their family is "actively engaged in choos-
ing schools."' There are a substantial number of school choice alternatives,
including vouchers." Vouchers involve providing parents with a certificate which
they can use in place of money to pay for their child's tuition at the private school
of their choice.'
ing fractions, decimals, percentages and simple algebra ....") Id.
97. See e.g. Carol Innerst, AFT Sues Cleveland to Stop New School Voucher Program,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, atA5.
98. See COOKSON, supra note 89, at 112-117. Parental choice and direct governmental aid
to private schools whether private or public has been practiced for some time in the
Netherlands and England with varying results.
99. John F. Witte, The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, in SCHOOL CHOICE,
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 69, 69-71 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993); see
CENTRE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, SCHOOL, A MATTER OF CHOICE
150 (1994). The program was started in the late 1980's by state representative Polly Williams.
Williams and other voucher supporters "resented the idea that the only way for black inner-city
children to get a good education was to be bussed miles out of town."
100. See CENTRE FOR EDUCATION RESEARCH, supra note 99, at 150, 151.
101. Id. at 149 ("around $2,700 in 1992-93.").
102. Witte, supra note 99, at 71 (the program is "carefully targeted and limited in a number
of important ways").
103. Id. at 71 (This "translates into approximately $22,000 for the modal three-person fam-
ily.").
104. Id. at 71 (The private school must also be within Milwaukee).
105. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 473-474 (Wis. 1992) The public purpose doc-
trine dictates that public expenditures must be for some public purpose. Id. In addition, the
Court found that the program did not violate the uniformity clause, which provides that all
schools should be free and as uniform or similar as possible. Id. The Court held that "the
M.P.C.P in no way deprives any student of the opportunity to attend a public school with a uni-
form character of education .... [T]he uniformity clause clearly was intended to assure cer-
tain minimal educational opportunities for the children of Wisconsin." Id. at 474.
106. See Michael E. Hartmann, Cleaning Up with Banquo's Ghost in the Dairyland? A Brief
(Economic) Analysis of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program's Unconstitutional
Conditioning of its Aid on an Effective Waiver of a Recipient's Free Exercise of Religion:
Professor Richard A. Epstein's Bargaining with the State and Miller v. Benson, 27 AKRON L.
REV. 445, 446 (1994) ("If a state gives school-choice aid to individual parents.., can it con-
stitutionally attach a condition coercing, pressuring, or inducing such a parent to in return
effectively waive the free exercise of religion by preventing the use of that aid-by, again, an
individual - for tuition at a sectarian school?") (emphasis in original).
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Milton Friedman is believed to be the first modern academic to propose
a type of educational voucher. Specifically, he suggested that families be given a
fixed stipend for each child in elementary or secondary school to be utilized at the
school of the parent's choice.92 Chief among his arguments for this type of system
is that it promotes competition between schools, leading to greater efficiency and
offering parents the type of programs they want for their children.-' Friedman's
plan, set forth in 1955, never met uniform public acceptance due in part to the
school segregation concerns which were being addressed at the same time, and
because the voucher program could possibly inhibit certain anti-segregation mea-
sures.'
107. See Miller v. Benson, 68 F.3d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1995). The initial voucher program did
not include religious schools. Id. Thereafter, the Wisconsin legislature repealed the Wisconsin
statute ( 119.23 and enacted a new statute which took away the requirement that the school be
non-secular "The new law, which took effect on July 29, 1995, authorize reimbursement of
tuition at religious schools, provided the schools (and students) meet the other statutory crite-
ria." Id. The 7th Circuit decided that this legislative measure made the Court battle to include
religious schools moot. Id.
108. See State v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140 ( Wis. 1996) (the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
evenly divided, and accordingly no definitive determination has been made concerning the
applicability of religious private schools in the M.P.C.P.); Cf. Suzanne M. Steinke, Comment,
The Exception to the Rule: Wisconsin's Fundamental Right to Education and Public School
Financing, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1995). Even though funding disparity persists in
Wisconsin, their courts have not taken an active role in rectifying the inadequacies. "The
Wisconsin Supreme Court... has not required the state legislature to create an equitable edu-
cation finance system."
109. See Witte, supra note 99, at 75. Witte performed case studies in the springs of 1991,
1992 and 1993 and the results of his data include a listing of students in the program, the attri-
tion rate, the number of private schools participating and the number of voucher applicants.
His study revealed that "the number of applicants to the school voucher program has grown in
1990-91 total of 577 to the 1992-93 total of 1034 students. In addition, the attrition rate, or the
number of students who failed to return to the program in subsequent years dropped from .465
to .35 between 1990-91 to 1991-92 .... "
110. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
11l. See Carol Innerst, Rights Groups, Teachers Join Suit to Block Vouchers, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1996, at A6 (William Mellor, a school voucher advocate and president of the Institute
for Justice stated, "The sole purpose of Ohio's voucher program is to help get poor kids an edu-
cation, period.").
112. Id. ("The district and 29 states, including Maryland and Virginia, have seen grass-roots
or legislative activity. . .[in favor of] vouchers .... ").
113. Sharon Schmickle, Today's Focus, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 14, 1996, at IA. State
Representative Michael Fox, a republican, believes the opportunity to pass the voucher pro-
gram greatly improved in 1994, when the Republicans gained a majority of the Ohio General
Assembly and joined a Republican Governor, George Voinovich. Id. Prior to that the issue of
school vouchers had divided the state of Ohio, but the political situation was different from a
state like Minnesota where a Republican governor was unable to produce the needed support
from the Minnesota legislature to pass a similar voucher plan. Id.
114. See id. (The proponents of the statewide voucher initiative saw opposition from sever-
al avenues including "teacher's unions ... suburban school board and PTA members- even
from members of [Governor] Voinovich's staff." Accordingly, the program shifted from a
statewide initiative to a lesser city-wide initiative).
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School voucher proposals began to resurface in the late 1980s due in large
part to President Ronald Reagan's cuts in federal spending.' - The public school
system was particularly vulnerable because despite educational spending increas-
es, student performance tests showed continuing decline." Currently, Milwaukee
and Cleveland are the only United States cities in with voucher programs.97
However, school vouchers have a long tradition outside the United States, partic-
ularly in England and the Netherlands."
V. EXISTING VOUCHER PROGRAMS
A. Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP"), the first govern-
ment-subsidized voucher program in the United States involving private schools,
was enacted in September, 199 0.1 The Milwaukee plan allows funds from the
state government which were initially targeted for the public schools to be utilized
for poor families as tuition at private schools.""' This grant to lower income chil-
dren is equivalent to the amount the state provides per pupil to each public school
district.'0
115. Andrew Benson, Rich or Poor, Family Income is Prime Predictor of How Well a Student
will Perform in School, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 8, 1995, at IC. The newspaper grading
these schools based on a two year set of student achievement tests and the passage rates on the
ninth grade proficiency exam. The author contends that the "relationship between the levels
of poverty in a [Cleveland] district and the passage rates on the ninth-grade proficiency test is
statistically significant." Id.
116. See Packing them in Series: Agenda 1996 Cleveland Schools, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 16, 1996, at 14B. The article also discusses the attempts by the Cleveland school district
to bring kids into schools during a student count. In order to receive certain state funds, the
Cleveland schools wanted as many of their enrolled students as possible to be in school dur-
ing this student count. The schools took measures that included "snow cones and skating par-
ties, pizzas and pencil sets." The system estimates that in 1995 they failed to count "6,000 to
7,000 students" which cost the district "well over I million dollars in state aid"; see also
Schmickle, supra note 113, at IA ("On the average day in Cleveland, 16,000 of the 72,000
public school students don't show up for classes."): But see Election '96: The Pressure is On:
Cleveland Wins School Levy, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK DAILY REPORT CARD, Nov.
11, 1996, at 6 (discussing the recent school levy which passed in the Cleveland area which
should help to alleviate school district financial woes).
117. See American Federation of Teachers Files Lawsuit Against The State of Ohio Over
Cleveland School Voucher Program, supra note 6, at * 1.
118. Id. ("75% to 90% of the cost of tuition for each child enrolled in the program" would
be paid out of state taxpayer pockets).
119. The statute provides that:
[E]ach Scholarship or grant to be used for payments to a registered private school or
an approved tutorial assistance provider is payable to the parents of the students enti-
tled to the scholarship or grant. Each scholarship to be used for payments to a pub-
lic school in an adjacent school district is payable to the school district of attendance
by the superintendent of public instruction.
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The MPCP is very specific in its purpose and scope."'2 Some school
voucher proposals tend to be more inclusive of lower to middle income families
but the Milwaukee plan requires the family "income limit be 175% of the pover-
ty line, '"' which is a low threshold. Additionally, there is a cap on the number of
students that could be involved in the program and a requirement that the school
selected must be private and non-secular.'4
Almost immediately, the boundaries of the Milwaukee plan were chal-
lenged. The voucher plan withstood an initial court challenge on March 3, 1992,
when the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the public purpose doctrine and the
uniformity clause of the Wisconsin Constitution was not violated by the MPCP
Initially, the federal courts were asked whether the Milwaukee program is consti-
tutional in light of its restraint on the students ability to utilize the school vouch-
er in religious private schools."' In the interim, the Wisconsin assembly passed
new legislation that included religious schools in the voucher program.""
However, the courts did not reach consensus whether the change to include secu-
lar private schools was constitutional.x
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ( 3313.979 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996). (Subsection (A) (2) pro-
vides in relevant part: "From time to time, the state superintendent shall make a payment to a
parent of each student entitled to a scholarship. Each payment shall include for each student.
a portion of seventy five or ninety percent... of the scholarship amount ...."). Id.
120. See Innerst, supra note 97, at A5.
121. See Tabor, supra note 1, at 2B. The funds are to come from the "state's Disadvantaged
Pupil Impact Aid Program."
122. Christopher Davey, Voucher Plan Faces suit: Group alleges church-state violation, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Jan 11, 1996, at B 1. Despite. the high number of applicants, a critic of the plan
contends that half of the children who will receive vouchers from the pilot project already
attend private schools.
123. See American Federation of Teachers Files Lawsuit Against The State of Ohio Over
Cleveland School Voucher Program, supra note 6, at *1 ("41 of the 43 private schools within
the city are religiously affiliated").
124. See OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. ( 3313.978 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996).
125. See Schmickle, supra note 113, at IA; Akron industrialist attorney David Brennan was
responsible for financing and developing the two non-sectarian schools. Id. Brennan, a
Republican, is considered a Milton Friedman voucher purist who believes that the education
consumer (the parent) is entitled to any curriculum they desire for their children and that the
voucher program is the best means to achieve that objective. Id. Brennan, while speaking
before an Ohio legislative committee prior to the adoption of the voucher plan said that
"research indicated that approximately 20% of the students' parents would choose vouchers."
David Brennan, Testimony to Assembly Senate Education, Retirement and Agent Committee
(Feb. 28, 1995) (available thru Hannah On-Line at Education, Select School Funding, Select
Report to Ohio Legis.)
In a telephone interview with David Brennan, he made clear his continuing desire to
help make educational vouchers a statewide program. Telephone interview with David
Brennan, Partner, Amer Cunningham & Brennan (Nov. 14, 1996) (notes from interview avail-
able from author). He believes that a universal school choice program could save millions of
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Some initial figures indicate that the Milwaukee choice program has been
taking incremental steps in both increasing the number of students wishing to par-
ticipate in the program, and also improving the number of students who stay in
the program." ' At this juncture, because of the limited scope of the program, it
would be difficult to determine whether the MPCP is an overall success, howev-
er its relative success in addressing lack of equity in school funding will be eval-
uated in this comment."'
dollars. Id. He contends the voucher initiative should be viewed not as an educational issue but
an economics issue. He was especially adamant in expressing that the current government
funded public school system is a monopoly which a voucher system can help to improve
through competition. Id. Even further, he contends that educational system in America resem-
bles a more Eastern European type system rather than the free enterprise system that this coun-
try was built on.
126. See American Federation of Teachers Files Lawsuit Against The State of Ohio Over
Cleveland School Voucher Program, supra note 6, at * 1.
127. See infra notes 177-197 and accompanying text (discussing the Equal Protection Clause
and the Pilot Project).
128. Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio C.P.,
Franklin Co., 1996), rev'd sub. nom. Simmons-Hams v. Goft, No 96 APEO9-982, 1997 WL
217583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
129. See infra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
130. The opponents of the Pilot Project attacked the rationale of the program and its poten-
tial effectiveness arguing the funds would be better appropriated to the public schools. See
Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *5.
13 1. The Court cited the federal Constitution which provides in the 1st Amendment that
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. Amend.
I. In addition, Section 7 Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the state law from giving
preference to a religion. OHIO CONST. Art. I, ( 7; see id. at *7; The Court found that neither
clause was violated because the "nonpublic sectarian schools participating in the scholarship
program are benefited only indirectly and purely as a result of the 'genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients'." Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *14.
132. See id. at *17 ("The General Assembly chose not to establish the program on a statewide
basis, choosing instead to establish it in a limited manner... [T]he General Assembly's choice
to establish the program only in ... Cleveland City School[s]... was reasonable... [s]ince the
General Assembly intended the program to be a pilot project ... ").
133. For a comprehensive discussion of the establishment clause constitutional concerns with
vouchers and private school choice, see Jeremy Paul, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting
Scholar Response - Losing Our Religion, 28 CONN. L. REV. 269 (1996); Michael J. Stick,
supra note 92; Peter J. Weishaar, comments, School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment
Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543 (1994); David Futterman, Note, School Choice and the Religion
Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L. J. 711
(1993); Amy Christine Hevly, Note, Nothing Simple or Certain: Establishment Clause
Barriers to Choice Systems in American Education, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (1993).
134. See Innerst, supra note 97, at A6 ("Ohio's Republican governor, George V. Voinovich
signed a two year state budge that includes a $5.25 million for a school-choice program in
Cleveland in the 1996-97 school year.").
135. Schmickle, supra note 113, at IA ("Opponents, including [President] Clinton, cite con-
stitutional concerns. They also argue that vouchers will sap support for state-run schools and
siphon taxpayers' money into a myriad of private schools that can't be held accountable for
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B. The Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship Program
The proponents of the educational voucher system received a boost when
in July of 1995, Cleveland became the second city to receive a state voucher pro-
gram.' This is despite efforts in the District of Columbia and twenty nine other
states to bring voucher programs into existence in their areas.' 2 The battle to get
the Pilot Project adopted in the Ohio State legislature was deemed "trench war-
fare" by one legislative supporter of the measure."' Upon realizing that the vouch-
er program would not pass on a statewide basis, Ohio legislators in favor of the
program turned their attention to the troubled Cleveland School District."4 Among
the many Cleveland School District concerns were: (1) "Cleveland ranked 595th
out of 600 school districts in Ohio, and 95th out of 96 school districts in the seven-
county Greater Cleveland area;"' 5 (2) Cleveland had more than $150 million dol-
lars of debt;"' and (3) in March 1995, a Federal Judge placed the Cleveland City
School District under state receivership."7
It is believed that the Pilot Project would be subsidized by state taxpay-
ers who would pay over three quarters for costs of the children involved in the
program.", The Pilot Project statute provides the parents of the students involved
in the program a voucher that can be used at private schools registered with the
state. '
what they teach.").
136. Eisdorfer, supra note 4, at 941 ("[T]he most radical school choice reforms would dis-
establish the existing system of public schools and replace it with a system of educational
vouchers ....").
137. Hawk, supra note 16, at 679 (Hawk provides the State School Executive Directors
response to Voinovich which was, "I would invite the governor and his staff to visit some of
these districts and show them how to get more for the buck .... He would find kids going to
school without bathrooms. He would find kids going to school in coal bins.").
138. Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing Public
Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 883 (1993) (citing PETER
F. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES 235 (1989)).
139. Id. at 883 ("Throughout the public sector, increasingly cash-strapped governments can-
not provide the services citizens demand .... The public sector on the local, state and even the
federal level has increasingly turned to the private sector.").
140. See GUTHRIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 318 (efficiency could mean one of several
things, including wanting it to "cost less, perform more quickly, be less complicated, have
more useful features, be of higher quality, and all for the same or lower price.").
141. Id. The author calls this "allocative efficiency" and describes a situation where a per-
son going to the store to buy bread, instead finds only starch or spaghetti available and hence,
the producers have not properly understood or "anticipated consumer preferences." Id. It fol-
lows from this that without new competitive market forces there is no way to buy bread. Id.
142. Id. Accordingly, "the near monopoly of the public schools may restrict choice more than
is necessary to protect the public welfare." Id.
143. See Futterman, supra note 133, at 728 ("The voucher plan clearly increases the financial
incentive to choose religious schools by lowering their price .... [T]he voucher system in the
primary and secondary school context significantly changes the price structure of the available
options. Under the voucher plan ... religious schools [are] more attractive.").
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Kindergarten through third grade students are eligible for these vouchers
which can be renewed through the completion of eighth grade.' 20 About 1,500
public school students are eligible for and could be provided the $2,250 vouch-
er,'2' for which there were upwards of 6,000 Cleveland parent applicants in
January of 1996.22 One difficulty the Ohio legislature faced in enacting the pro-
gram was that the Cleveland area had very few non-secular private schools for
children to attend.' 21 The legislative response to this concern was to allow for sec-
tarian private schools to be considered eligible as a private school under the Pilot
Project.' 24 In addition, one proponent of the Cleveland voucher program funded
and created two nonsectarian schools in the Cleveland area because of the Pilot
Project.' 2. Nevertheless, allowing students to utilize vouchers at religiously affili-
ated private schools draws into question whether the Pilot Project violates the
Establishment Clause, 2' and the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses.'27
The first challenge to the Pilot Project was in the Franklin County
Common Pleas court case of Gatton v. Goff.'28 Although much of the argument
centered on legal criterion, particularly constitutional grounds, 29 the school
choice opponents did place several policy arguments before the court in Gatton
and questioned the legislative decisionmakers in passing this law. 's" The Court
found that '[i]t is not the purview of this court to consider the wisdom behind the
program at issue." However, the Court did address arguments based on the fed-
eral and state Establishment Clauses.'' The court seemed swayed by the fact that
the Ohio legislature intended the program to be experimental in nature and lim-
ited in its size and scope, and upheld the program. -2 A more extensive statewide
program could well have been declared unconstitutional or at the very least have
been subject to greater scrutiny, particularly based on the Establishment Clause.'1
144. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 1017 (In a universal voucher system "[o]nly schools that
provide what the consumer demands, quality and efficiency for example, would survive."); see
also Peyser, supra note 88, at 619-620. (Peyser believes that choice will occur for three rea-
sons: "[f]irst, parental wishes in a matter as life-shaping as education should not be ignored or
overridden by state bureaucrats... Id. at 619 second, choice strengthens parental commitment
to the schools their children attend... [t]hird choice has inherent value within a free society."
Id. at 620.
145. A glorious example of this is in Fridlay High School in Minneapolis where Cathy
Nelson, a Ph.D. history teacher, once named the state of Minnesota's teacher of the year, was
laid off under a teacher's union requirement that the last hired would be first fired in that
school district. Nelson was laid off a total of three times under the policy and, by 1990, decid-
ed to leave teaching. See Toch et al., supra note 3, at 64. Additionally, some courts have pro-
tected school board decisions to provide more experienced teachers tenure, making them hard-
er to dismiss from work. See Board of Educ. v. Raubinger, 187 A.2d 614 (N.J. 1963) (con-
tending that creating tenured positions for the principal or teachers makes the school system
strong and efficient.).
146. Cf Kramer, supra note 4, at 1009 ("[P]roviding parents with the power to choose a non-
public school for their child will compel the public school ... to increase the quality and effi-
ciency of the school's services.").
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Despite its limited scope and size, the overall cost of the Pilot Project is
said to be over $5.25 million dollars per year." Opponents of the program are
very concerned that the voucher program will strip public schools of necessary
funding (in Ohio that figure is several million dollars a year), and may have a
detrimental effect on the overall state of public school education. "
The difficult question is which argument is correct. The proponents argu-
ment that vouchers will create competition and efficiency in the public schools,
or the opponents argument that the funding is best spent on updating the public
school system as it exists. In essence, the issue is whether vouchers work as a
means of remedying school financing problems.
147. Michael A. Rebell, Educational Voucher Reform: Empirical Insights from the
Experience of New York's Schools for the Handicapped, 14 URB. LAW. 441, 443 (1982) (
"[C]urrent private schools, by eliminating high administrative overhead, expensive facilities
and extra personnel, keep costs almost 50 percent below average public school costs." ).
Voucher advocates believe that they can provide solutions to the two major problems in pub-
lic schools, "fiscal retrenchment and integration."
148. Deborah E. Beck, Note, Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for
Desegregating an Inner City School District, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1047 (1993). Specifically,
the State of Wisconsin spends $3500 to $5000 per public school pupil as opposed to the $2500
per pupil at the private school. Id. The author suggests that the St. Louis School system adopt
a voucher program like Milwaukee in order to further desegregation in the city public schools.
Id.
149. Witte, supra note 99, at 103.
150. The results of this survey by Paul Peterson have been disputed by another scientist, John
Witte, who contends that there has been no noticeable difference in test scores between private
school voucher students and public schools students. See Bob Davis, Class Warfare: Dueling
Professors have Milwaukee Dazed over School Vouchers, WALL ST.J., Oct. 11, 1996, at Al.
Witte tested Milwaukee public school students generally against the voucher students, howev-
er, Mr. Peterson tested voucher students against random applicants who did not enter the
voucher program. Id. Voucher proponents believe that the first step to making the public-
schools more efficient is by outperforming the public schools equal to the public schools at a
lower cost. Id.
151. Eugenia Froedge Toma, Public Funding and Private Schooling Across Countries, 39
J.L. & ECON. 121, 121 (1996) "Production studies that have examined the relative perfor-
mance of students in private and public schools typically find that the average student achieve-
ment in private school exceeds that of the average student in public schools. Id. The relative-
ly small enrollment of students in private schools seriously limits policy predictions concern-
ing the effects of vouchers and other policy reforms in the United States."). Id. In an exami-
nation of four country systems found that in Belgium, Canada, France and New Zealand,
where the state funds the private schools, the private schools substantially outperform public
schools. See Id. at 123. However, the author does point out that private schools are tradition-
ally smaller and larger enrollment may be detrimental to there overall success. Id. at 121.
152. See Witte, supra note 99, at 113-115 (contending that the "family and student back-
ground" and the "academic track" are the keys to "slightly higher" test scores).
153. Albert Shanker & Bella Rosenberg, Do Private Schools Outperform Public Schools, in
THE CHOICE CONTROVERSY 128, 128 (Peter W. Cookson, Jr. ed., 1992). These authors con-
tend that private school students have richer parents who tend to be more involved in their edu-
cation which also effects achievement scores. Id. They also contend that in most testing that
the results show equivalent achievement between private and public schools. Id. It should be
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VI. SCHOOL VOUCHERS AS MEANS TO REMEDY SCHOOL FINANCING
PROBLEMS
Fundamentally, there are four arguments made by school choice and
voucher advocates which set forward why these programs can create equity in
education: (1) Choice/vouchers are a more efficient way to run the school system;
(2) Choice/vouchers could eliminate the administrative defects currently pro-
hibiting schools from being effective; (3) Choice/vouchers provide an incentive
to get parents more involved in their children's education; and (4) Choice/vouch-
ers gives the impoverished family the same alternatives in schooling as the afflu-
ent.'36 As opposed to state equalization programs, each of these arguments focus-
es on the open market's ability to drive educational costs down through competi-
tion, making it affordable for all students, and creating equity in education.
A. Can Efficiency Be Achieved Through Vouchers and Competition?
When Ohio governor George Voinovich was asked about the Ohio public
school system, he stated that "[i]t's time for results. It's time to get something out
of our money .... They have to do what everybody else has to do. They have to
restructure.""' 7 Central to the argument for vouchers is the lack of the competition
incentive in the public schools. As one commentator suggests:
America is the only major developed country in which there is no
competition within the school system. The French have two para-
llel systems... a public one and a Catholic one, both paid for by
the state. So do the Italians. Germany has the Gymnasium .... In
Japan, schools are graded by the performance of their students on
university entrance exams. The teachers of high ranking schools
are recognized, promoted and paid accordingly. The American pub-
lic school, by contrast, has a near monopoly-no performance stand-
ards and little competition either within the system or from the out-
side.138
noted that one of the authors, Albert Shanker, is the head the American Federation of Teacher.
154. See e.g., Nanci Hellmich, Values and Good Manners are on the Curriculum, U.S.A.
TODAY, Oct. 16, 1996, at 6D ("After years of declining enrollment, attendance at parochial
schools has been on the upswing since 1990.").
155. See Julie H. Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization of
Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381, 396- 397 (1992) ("A pure educational voucher system oper-
ates on the theory that families will enroll their children in the best available school ... [and]
vouchers encourage families to leave the public school system rather than voice dissatisfaction
156. A great deal of research indicates that "race and class based views" affect a parents
ability to determine what truly is a good or bad school . For example, black parents tend to
perceive a school as "good" if it is predominately white. Accordingly, an all white school with
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Unquestionably, American schools need to get more "flexible, adaptive
and innovative."'" The question is whether vouchers can do this. Defining effi-
ciency in education is a difficult endeavor because it could mean several things.'"'
What is clear is that efficiency in education is "enhanced when providers [includ-
ing private schools] are free to enter the marketplace with new ideas, products and
services and when consumers are at liberty to select from what is available." "I' In
our present school scenario, public schools are expansive and clearly controlling
the market.'42 A voucher plan could change this by making private schools,
whether religious or not, a viable alternative by improving their financial com-
petitiveness with public schools.'43 Some contend that this type of competitiveness
will spark the public schools to respond to consumer (parent) demand and provide
the quality of service that the parent desires.'"
One of the ways a voucher system couldoperate to spark competitiveness
and efficiency is in the area of hiring and retention of teaching talent. In the cur-
rent public school system, seniority overcomes teaching talent and skill because
seniority rules prohibit school administrators from dismissing ineffective veteran
teachers, forcing the school to dismiss competent but less senior teachers.'45 The
school voucher program could combat this development by providing the com-
petitive public school the incentive to keep good teachers.'46 Otherwise, they
could lose these teachers to private schools along with their students.
poor teachers or a poor curriculum would still be perceived as a "good" school by some par-
ents. One author believes that voucher advocates who point to competition, including Milton
Freidman, are typical of those who do not understand preferences in evaluating schools. See
Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Do Parents Choose School Quality or School Status? A
Sociological Theory of Free Market Education, in THE CHOICE CONTROVERSY 65, 65-67(Peter W. Cookson, Jr. ed., 1992).
157. See id. at 67 ("It is important to keep in mind that school choice policy will only force
schools to improve if parents prefer 'school quality'- in terms of the actual instruction ...
in the classroom - over other school characteristics, such as location, extracurricular activi-
ties, or the status of the students who attend.").
158. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
159. See Davis, supra note 150, at A1 ("The [voucher] fight also reached into Sunday's pres-
idential debate . . . . Mr. Clinton responded that he wouldn't back federal voucher schemes
that 'take money away from all the children we now help with limited federal funds and help
far fewer.").
160. See Shmitz, supra note 6, at 1642 ( "A study of sixth graders at over a thousand inner
city schools, for example, reported that all but a handful had average reading scores more than
a year below the national average." ). The author points to the "existence of decrepit, danger-
ous and over-crowded facilities" as the key reasons for this lack of achievement. Id. at 1643.
161. Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 37, 39 (1993)(This could "lead-at a minimum-to the impoverishment of the public
schools and the establishment of a two-tiered educational system.").
162. One author discusses a Kentucky Supreme Court decision and states that there is a need
for educational reform, not by increasing the financial "input" to public schools, but rather by
focusing on the "output". Joslin, supra note 15, at 1264-65. The author suggests this can be
done by focusing on "incentives and not more money." Id. at 1264.
[Vol. 30:3
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 30 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol30/iss3/3
UTILIZING SCHOOL VOUCHER PLANS
Another argument for the voucher program is that private schools have
managed to educate children at a lower cost than public schools, making them
more efficient. One author contends that private schools keep costs per pupil
almost fifty percent below that of public schools.'47 These numbers are quite
telling, and call into question whether the public schools really do have the abili-
ty to restructure their resources and better cost maximize.
This exact concern can be found in the Milwaukee City schools system
where the private nonsectarian schools clearly can and have provided a less
expensive education than the public schools.'4" Researchers of the MPCP have
stated that due to the small scale of the program, any results of the 'competition'
between private and public schools in Milwaukee is inconclusive.'49 At least one
scientist contends that voucher students have performed better on standardized
tests than other random students who were rejected from the voucher plan.''" If
this is true, the Milwaukee public schools should stand up and take notice of the
private school's ability to better educate students at a lower cost.
Additionally, several studies have shown that private school student
achievement is higher than that of public schools.'5 ' While these private school
students continually outperform their public school counterparts, some authors
still believe that the influence of private schools on achievement is insignificant
and point to such things as the student's background, including family involve-
ment, and the type of academic curriculum the individual student takes, as the real
reasons for the small differences in achievement.' 2 Still others contend that
because of the socioeconomic differences between private and public school stu-
dents, and the fact that private schools are selective in their admissions, private
school students are underachieving unless they leave public schoolers "in the
dust."'53 Whatever the cause, the fact remains that private school students in gen-
eral outperform public school students in achievement tests. It is also interesting
to note that private school enrollment, after years of decline, is now on the rise.' -
163. Particularly, the selective plans such as the Milwaukee Parental Choice Plan and the
Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship program, which are both small and selective in their crite-
rion for involvement. See Schmickle, supra note 113, at IA.
164. See Heise, supra note 63, at 1737; see also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text
(discussing the state's responsibility to provide an efficient education).
165. Futterman, supra note 133, at 729. The author in discussing the constitutionality of
tuition plans, assumes a more comprehensive voucher plan would pass Constitutional muster.
Id. The larger size plan would increase availability of vouchers to a great many more students.
Id.
166. See Shmickle, supra note 113, at IA.
167. Clifford S. Romans, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools: Compelling State
Interest and the First Amendment I (1981) (Dissertation, Kent St. Univ.).
168. One author labels this concern a violation of the "accountability clause" because pri-
vate actors do not focus on the desire to act in the public interest in providing their education-
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Another key factor, that most scholars agree upon, is that parents would
choose a more efficient or better school if given the voucher option.'" Some con-
tend, however, that the social status of the parents, including their racial and eco-
nomic class, interferes with their ability to be self maximizing consumers in the
education setting.'56 Accordingly, while a school may be economically efficient in
educating students and maximizing their student achievement, some parents
might still choose to have their child forego attending the school and choose
another based on the parent's background and belief of what is a good school. '"
There are also those who contend that achievement tests are not a fair indicator of
academic achievement.'"
Alternatively, if the economic model is correct, the efficiency of private
schools and their increased competition with public schools in the voucher arena
could lessen the burden on school financing schemes and taxes by making all
schools operate on less money. Accordingly, the inequities of the property tax
based financing scheme could be equalized by providing vouchers to all state stu-
dents.
B. Arguments Against Vouchers as School Financing Remedy
The first argument brought by voucher opponents is that public schools
are as efficient as they can be, based on their clear lack of resources. 59 The pub-
lic schools in some poor urban areas lack sufficient funding, which truly creates
the low quality education overall.'"" One critic writes that "[flunds allocated to pay
for vouchers inevitably come out of the overall public school budget. In a time
of shrinking state revenues and substantial cuts in federal education assistance, it
makes little sense to expropriate precious resources from the public schools and
give them to private schools."'' However, at least one legal scholar and some
courts contend that the answer to educational problems does not rest in increasing
the money spent on public schools.' 2
al services, while public schools must follow the public interest. Vallarelli, supra note 155, at
393. Accordingly, "private providers are most likely to overlook the effects of their programs
on community members who do not use their schools." Id.
169. The greater interplay between state regulation and attempts to control religious institu-
tions have produced the most litigation in areas such as "teacher regulations and curriculum."
Romans, supra note 170, at 2.
170. Vallarelli, supra note 155, at 391 ( "Because schools in almost every state are operated
by local bodies, the delegation of municipal functions to private actors is of primary interest.").
171. Id. at 392 ("Courts are more likely to uphold private delegations when the interests of
the private actor resemble those of the delegating body or its constituents.").
172. See id. at 392-393 ("Education may therefore appear ministerial but its substantive con-
tent, which can significantly affect students and their families, is quite discretionary ... ").
173. The development of this type of program "creates a level of expertise in teachers and
enriches the curriculum so that parents desire their children to be involved in the program."
See Mary A. Raywid, The Mounting Case for Schools of Choice, in PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY
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A more compelling argument against school vouchers is that they are a
selective remedy which do nothing to improve the system overall, but rather only
help a few individual students.' 3 School voucher opponents point out that all chil-
dren are entitled to a certain level of education and it is the state's responsibility
to provide that for them, and to bring all school districts up to par by increasing
financing."M Currently, the Milwaukee and Cleveland plans only effect a few stu-
dents, and only by substantially increasing the size and scope of a plan could
vouchers "at least nominally be available to help all students."'6 5
Voucher programs which utilize private schools also raise another con-
cern. Opponents of vouchers, including President Clinton, contend that the pri-
vate schools involved cannot be held accountable for what they teach.'" There are
and have been a panoply of different state government attempts to regulate private
schools, their requirements and curriculum. 67 However, private schools may not
be required or may not wish to respond to these regulations.' One overwhelming
problem could be that vouchers would lead to an increase in litigation because as
one researcher contends, "the states which have the most extensive [school
requirements and] regulations . . .were the states which have experienced [the
most] legal challenges." 169 This may also call into question the nondelegation
doctrine, which limits the ability of the state or municipal government to vest pri-
vate actors with state power.'" Tnming over education entirely to private school
actors in a voucher program may violate the anti-delegation clause. At this junc-
ture, "the delegation of municipal power allow private actors to perform functions
that are administrative, ministerial and proprietary rather than executive, discre-
tionary and governmental in nature."'' It would seem that an educational institu-
tion, by setting up and implementing their curriculum, has a great deal of discre-
tion.' 2
CHOICE 13 (Joe Nathan ed., 1989).
174. GUTHRIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 332.
175. Toch et al., supra note 3, at 71. These measures include "performance-based pay in
Cincinnati, and policing of the teaching ranks by peers in Columbus ..... Id.
176. A voucher plan would also face challenges under the state and federal establishment
clause. See supra note 133.
177. Kramer, supra note 4, at 1041 ("The Equal Protection Clause could pose a barrier to a
poorly drafted voucher program ... .
178. Id. at 1041-1042.
179. This is particularly true in school districts which are attempting to utilize a choice plan,
such as vouchers, to remedy their existing segregation problem. See Philip T.K. Daniel, A
Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems Be
Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,47-48 (1993). The use of school vouchers to remedy exist-
ing segregation problems has been discussed in several articles. For an example, see the exten-
sive discussion of vouchers to remedy segregation in Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private
School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1995). See generally
James B. Egle, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 459, 495-496 (1992).
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School voucher opponents also point to several alternatives within the
public school framework which could increase efficiency in educating students
without vouchers. One such approach would be to increase the amount of non-
traditional schools, such as alternative or magnet schools, within existing school
districts so that parents may select to send their children to these special schools
with greater expertise.'7 Another approach that may be taken, within the public
school system is "client opinion polling", where a school district, not unlike a pri-
vate company, incorporates customer (parent) feedback.'74 In addition, school
teachers and their unions have begun to incorporate salary increases based on the
teachers achievement, as opposed to experience, as a means to increase account-
ability and efficiency in public schools.'7
Some measures need to be taken to make public schools more account-
able for the product that they put out, and these measures are certainly a step in
the right direction. However, voucher proponents insist that an outside force
would be more effective than these internal mechanisms.
180. Freidman's original school choice proposal was not given consideration because some
viewed it as encouraging racial segregation. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing desegregation concerns).
181. Among the concerns of voucher opponents is that low income families will be left with
no financial ability to pay for educational costs beyond the amount of the voucher, and these
children would be left again with a poorer quality of education due to the costs. See Kramer,
supra note 4, at 1041.
182. See Egle, supra note 179, at 495 ("Why would students of one race tend to congregate
in one school? Racism may be one answer... students may be constrained by a lack of infor-
mation. Wealthy families have more resources to purchase information.").
183. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the challenge based
on equality instead of adequacy).
184. One commentator contends that the language of Rodriguez goes far in evaluating the
equal protection claim. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 1044-1045. Because, the court must find
that "an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy the state benefit" exists,
which would not be found in most instances because although the proportionate share of funds
from one district to another may be different, it does not mean that an absolute deprivation
exists. Id. at 1045.
185. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing school finance litigation and
inadequacy arguments).
186. See Hawk, supra note 16, at 694-696 (discussing the DeRolph trial court decision which
set forward that "education is a fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution" and as such the
school foundation program was subject to strict scrutiny and was invalidated.) The DeRolph
trial court spent a portion of its decision discussing the poor school conditions in some dis-
tricts, which is indicative of a school financing argument based on adequacy and not equality.
Cf DeRolph v. State, No. 2043, slip op. 463, 474 (Ohio C.P., Perry 1994).
187. See Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01721, 1996 WL 466499, at *4 (Ohio
C.P., Franklin, 1996) rev'd sub. nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96 APE08-982, 1997 WL
217583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The plaintiffs in Gatton attempted to utilize "Section 2 Article
VI of the Ohio Constitution which requires the General Assembly to "secure a thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the state" in order to prove their inadequacy
claim. The trial court gave no mention to any argument by plaintiff under the state equal
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VII. EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS AND COURT SCRUTINY OF SCHOOL
VOUCHER PROGRAMS
A. Equal Protection Analysis
Even if the school voucher programs can be viewed as a viable alterna-
tive in school financing, the voucher system would still need to overcome ajudi-
cial challenge under the equal protection clause.'76 Some contend that the key to
whether the voucher program survives court review depends on how the plan is
drafted.' Notwithstanding, it is clear that an extensive voucher program would
not survive judicial scrutiny based upon the following: (1) Vouchers can arguably
create and perpetuate racial segregation; (2) Vouchers fail to provide an adequate
education to all students; and (3). A voucher program will not survive the two -
tiered equal protection analysis.
The first argument against a state wide school vouchers are that they cre-
ate racial segregation,' and, if drafters base the voucher plan on the use of racial
quotas, it may fail to provide the students equal protection under the law.
79
Traditionally, school voucher programs were attacked based on the potential to
create racial segregation.""'Even today, opponents of the plans point to the possi-
bility that the programs would "exclude low income families from the voucher's
benefits if the amount of the voucher is insufficient to cover the total cost of pri-
vate education."'"' This could lead to a situation where lower income minority
children and higher income white children become segregated into two separate
educational institutions.' 2
protection requirement.
188. See id. at *18. The program will effectually "deprive the students in the Cleveland City
School District of fair educational opportunities by funneling students and economic resources
.... Id.
189. Id. at *19.
190. For example, if a private school decides to exclude a protected class under equal pro-
tection analysis, such as based on race or religion. Where this is problematic is that private
schools may not be accountable to the state under a voucher scheme for these actions. See
supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
191. See Richard C. Reuben, Are School Voucher Plans Constitutional?, 1993 CAL. LAW.
35, 38 (1993). (In discussing a California School Voucher initiative, a Pepperdine University
Constitutional Law Professor Bernard James stated "the voucher program's flaw on basic
notions of equality is too strong to be ignored. Id. at 38. If this initiative is approved and we
end up with a lot of private schools that reject students on the basis of immutable characteris-
tics, the result is inconsistent with the equal protection objectives of the 14th Amendment." Id.
192. Id. at 39. Professor Jesse Choper contends that if the protected class is race, that "[i]t
is clear.., that any deliberate discrimination by schools could result in a court order cutting
off the aid under the equal protection clause." Id.
193. No discussion was given to this type of argument in the Franklin County Common Pleas
decision. It should be noted, however, that this argument is intertwined with an Establishment
Clause concern which was addressed in the Franklin County Common Pleas decision. See
Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *15-19.
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How would the state courts address this problem with vouchers under
their equal protection clauses? Assuming that the amount of the voucher is insuf-
ficient to cover the total cost of education, the success of the voucher opponent
might depend on how they choose to frame their challenge. For example, if the
voucher opponent argues that the program operates in a manner where all children
are not treated equally,"3 it is less likely that a court might find an equal protec-
tion violation." ' However, an argument based on inadequacy in school funding
under the voucher plan may be more successful.' 5
The Ohio courts, for example, have been more willing to criticize school
financing plans because they fail to provide a certain level of adequacy for all
children.'86 Perhaps in recognition of this, school voucher opponents attempted to
utilize this argument in their court challenge to the Pilot Project.'87 The opponents
contended that the Pilot Project took students and resources from public schools,
which diminished the quality of education for those who remained in public
schools.'88 The common pleas court was not convinced of the merits of this argu-
ment, finding it "purely speculative," which makes it appear that the plaintiff must
provide something more substantial to indicate an inadequacy.' 9
Equality in applying a statewide voucher program could be an argument,
however, where a private school is selective in their entrance requirements.'", For
example, if the selectivity involves a protected class, the application of the vouch-
er program would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.'"' The Court would in all
likelihood then strike down the voucher program.' 92
194. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the two tiered equal protection
framework).
195. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
196. This argument can be supported by some recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussing Equal Protection and the Free Exercise Clause. In one case, the Supreme Court stat-
ed that "[tiree exercise can be guaranteed only when legislators.., are required to accord their
own religions the very same treatment given to small, new or unpopular denominations."
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982).
197. See Stick, supra note 92, at 464 ("When the challenged statute grants denominational
preferences, strict scrutiny must be applied.").
198. 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
199. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (discussing the M.P.C.P. court chal-
lenges.).
200. See Andres, supra note 179, at 796 (arguing that "private school vouchers provide an
effective remedy for violations of students' state education right under state constitutions).
201. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
202. See Beck, supra note 148, at 1029. The Kansas City school district (KCMSD) has been
ordered to be desegregated. Id. "To date, however, none of the court-ordered remedies ... has
succeeded .... The author argues that an alternative remedy-by which the KCMSD would pro-
vide tuition vouchers to black children to enable them to attend private schools in the district-
is constitutional and worthy of consideration." Id.
203. See Andres, supra note 179, at 802-803. Among these are challenges in "Jenkins v.
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Under the traditional two-tiered equal protection framework, a voucher
opponent may choose to attack the Pilot Project based on its inclusion of religious
private schools.'93 Under the two tiered framework, a court would first evaluate
whether the law affects a fundamental right or whether the plaintiff's class is sus-
pect under the law."9 Although the Ohio courts have struggled with the issue, it
appears that education is not a fundamental right under Ohio law, which would
eliminate the opponents first contention.'"5 In addition, the opponent can contend
that religious institutions which do not operate private schools, or operate reli-
gious private schools which cannot get state approval to enter the program, are
treated unfairly under the Pilot Project and hence, the plan violates the Equal
Protection Clause.'96 If religion is deemed a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause,9 ' the Pilot Project statute would be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. Since the state then needs to provide a compelling interest for the Pilot
Project as drafted, it is quite likely it would be found to violate equal protection.
Other voucher plans have been attacked under state and federal equal pro-
tection clauses, but the results are inconclusive. For example, the federal courts in
Wisconsin were faced with an equal protection challenge to the M.S.C.P. in Miller
v. Benson.' The issue became moot, however, before the court attempted to
address it."
B. Vouchers as a Judicial Remedy
Additionally, vouchers have long been considered and discussed as a
potential judicial remedy for school financing inequities. 21"Clearly, most advo-
cates of the educational voucher contend that it is a better means of distributing
resources than existing school financing plans, including some equalization mea-
sures.2"' In addition, at least one author has suggested that vouchers could be used
to remedy desegregation in some inner city schools.2"2 Some plaintiffs have even
begun to request vouchers as a remedy in their education litigation."" In these
instances, vouchers would be used to supplement or to make up for the deficien-
cies in the existing property tax based financing system, perhaps temporarily or in
a small region."' On a smaller scale, the voucher programs might be successful.
However, a complete statewide scheme of school vouchers available to all stu-
dents rich or poor,2"" might create the same inadequacies of the existing property
Leininger in Chicago and Arviso v. Dawson in Los Angeles .... Id. at 802. The plaintiffs in
each instance have "argued that their local public schools did not provide them with adequate
educational opportunities." Id. at 803. It should be noted that they did not make their demand
under a call for equality between districts. Id.
204. See id. at 808 ("Vouchers provide a quick, effective, and narrowly tailored remedy for
violations of education rights... [while] courts [are not forced into] becoming involved in dif-
ficult policy decisions.").
205. See supra notes 113-114 (discussing the Ohio voucher proponents attempts to pass a
statewide voucher program).
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tax financing arrangements. 2" Although voucher opponents believe the system
can operate to create equity in financing, the voucher system would still need
some state fundraising mechanism, which alone could create the same concerns
as the property tax based financing scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is undoubtedly true that some measures need to be taken by the state
governments to ease our troubled public school education system. However, edu-
cational vouchers as a means to spark efficiency in our schooling system may not
be an answer in itself. There still remains a gaping hole in the property based
school financing system which truly fails to properly distribute the necessary
funds to properly educate all of our students.2" While voucher proponents may
wish for a statewide system of choice, the legal hurdles, specifically the
Establishment Clause 2,, and the state and federal Equal Protection Clauses,2' may
eventually dismantle their plan. Vouchers may be a stronger alternative when uti-
lized on a small scale, as a remedy in desegregation cases, or as a means to bol-
ster an ailing public school system, as in Cleveland. But, the voucher efficiency
model championed by Friedman may be fallacious, particularly where public
schools truly have no fat to trim to become "competitive."
DOMINICK CIRELLI, JR.
206. For example, richer families could still add money on top of a voucher to send their
children to more exclusive schools which other voucher parents could not afford under a
statewide system; See also supra notes 51-84 and accompanying text (discussing the local
property tax school financing shortcomings).
207. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 126, 133 and accompanying text (discussing the Pilot Project and the
establishment clause).
209. See supra notes 176-195 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection concerns).
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